Left on the shelf: Explaining the failure of public inquiry recommendations
Author:Alastair Stark
Abstract
Public inquiries remain the pre‐eminent mechanism for lesson‐learning after high‐profile failures. However, a regular complaint is that their recommendations get ‘shelved’. In political science, the most common explanation for this lack of implementation tells us that elites mobilize bias in order to undermine inquiry lesson‐learning. This article tests this thesis via an international comparison of inquiries in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK. A series of alternative explanations for shelving emerge, which tell us that inquiry recommendations do not get implemented when: they do not respect the realities of policy transfer; they are triaged into policy refinement mechanisms; and they arrive at the ‘street level’ without consideration of local delivery capacities. These explanations tell us that the mobilization of bias thesis needs to be reworked in relation to public inquiries so that it better recognizes the complex reality of public policy in the modern state.
Parliamentary scrutiny of executive patronage: The relationship between institutional norms, reputation and accountability
Author:Felicity Matthews
Abstract
While executive patronage brings important benefits in terms of governance and control, political influence over the selection of agency staff entails a democratic dilemma: how should the exercise of executive patronage be controlled? This article addresses this critical issue, examining Westminster's system of pre‐appointment scrutiny by analysing an original database that encompasses every pre‐appointment hearing held between 2007 and 2018. The article demonstrates that although the conduct of hearings accords with select committees’ longstanding commitment to cross‐party working, members have not prioritized pre‐appointment scrutiny relative to their other committee activities. By systematically disaggregating the factors which affect how select committees dispatch this account‐holding responsibility, the article deepens previous analyses of pre‐appointment scrutiny, and dovetails with scholarship examining the institutional determinants of select committee power. More broadly, it draws attention to the reputational dynamics of accountability, and how institutional norms can serve as vital reputational resources, enabling account‐holders to demonstrate ‘responsible’ account‐holding.
(source:Public Administration Volume 98, Issue 3)