Keeping a watchful eye in times of turmoil? How repeated structural reform leads to more attention to political signals

Author：Jan Wynen  Bjorn Kleizen  Koen Verhoest  Per Lægreid  Vidar Rolland

Abstract

An important rationale for the creation of semi‐autonomous agencies is to create some distance between politics and administration. As such, agencies are expected to shield policy implementation from the daily concerns of political life. However, political actors and politically controlled ministries still influence agencies in various intended and unintended ways. This article focuses on intensive long‐term series of structural reforms and how they may undermine the original design philosophy underpinning agencification. We utilize a dataset combining staff surveys and a structural reform database to perform multilevel analyses of employees nested in organizations. We find that the frequency with which agencies have experienced structural reform affects the weight that employees attach to signals from political and ministerial principals. Frequent structural reform may lead to heightened perceptions of the importance of political signals. Hence, frequent structural reforms may increase the risk of political influence on agencies that were designed to operate impartially.

Stability not change: Improving frontline employee motivation through organizational reform is harder than it looks

Author：Nina M. van Loon  Martin Baekgaard  Donald P. Moynihan

Abstract

As evidence mounts about the positive effects of autonomous motivation such as public service motivation, there is a growing case for public organizations to design reforms to better support public employees’ inherent desire to help others. But how feasible is this in reality? Most experimental evidence on autonomous motivation stems from interventions at the individual level, possibly exaggerating what government reforms can achieve in reality. We present a longitudinal study that analyses a three‐year trial in Danish hospitals in which incentives and autonomy were changed to encourage autonomous motivation. This set‐up offers a rare opportunity to observe the potential malleability of intrinsic, public service, user and external motivation. The results show little observable change in motivation due to the reform. We explore the practical difficulties of translating evidence about motivation into reforms given implementation challenges, contextual factors and a recognition that motivation might be less malleable than implied by research.

（source：Public Administration Volume 98, Issue 3）